Economic impacts of illness in older workers: quantifying the impact of illness on income, tax revenue and government spending by Schofield, Deborah J. et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
Economic impacts of illness in older workers:
quantifying the impact of illness on income,
tax revenue and government spending
Deborah J Schofield1*, Rupendra N Shrestha2, Richard Percival3, Megan E Passey4, Simon J Kelly3 and
Emily J Callander2
Abstract
Background: Long term illness has far reaching impacts on individuals, and also places a large burden upon
government. This paper quantifies the indirect economic impacts of illness related early retirement on individuals
and government in Australia in 2009.
Methods: The output data from a microsimulation model, Health&WealthMOD, was analysed. Health&WealthMOD
is representative of the 45 to 64 year old Australian population in 2009. The average weekly total income, total
government support payments, and total taxation revenue paid, for individuals who are employment full-time,
employed part-time and not in the labour force due to ill health was quantified.
Results: It was found that persons out of the labour force due to illness had significantly lower incomes ($218 per
week as opposed to $1167 per week for those employed full-time), received significantly higher transfer payments,
and paid significantly less tax than those employed full-time or part-time. This results in an annual national loss of
income of over $17 billion, an annual national increase of $1.5 billion in spending on government support
payments, and an annual loss of $2.1 billion in taxation revenue.
Conclusions: Illness related early retirement has significant economic impacts on both the individual and on
governments as a result of lost income, lost taxation revenue and increased government support payments. This
paper has quantified the extent of these impacts for Australia.
Background
Chronic disease has emerged as the major health issue
of the 21th century with 60% of deaths worldwide (87%
of deaths in high income countries) attributable to
chronic conditions [1,2]. In addition to the personal suf-
fering born by patients with a long-term health condi-
tion, numerous studies have argued that poor health
may also exclude people from the labour force and thus
prevent them from obtaining sufficient economic
resources [3,4].
Illness related early retirement has been identified as
having significant economic impacts in virtually all
OECD countries [5]. The economic costs to society
come in a variety of forms, and include lost income to
individuals and lost tax revenue and increased welfare
expenditure for governments [6].
Internationally, some research has been undertaken to
assess the economic impacts of various individual dis-
eases [2,7-10]. However, these studies have generally
focused only on loss of income and exclude, for exam-
ple, reductions in occupational based pension plans and
reductions in taxation revenue from earned income. In
addition, previous research has not examined disaggre-
gated individual outcomes but rather only aggregated
outcomes.
This paper provides estimates of some of the indirect
costs to individuals and governments that are associated
with illness-related early retirement, using the Australian
population aged 45-64 as an example. The costs of early
retirement have been specifically recognised by the
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Australian government [11], where it is estimated that
58% of men and 26% of women who retire from full-
time work early (before the age of 55 years, the age
when Australian citizens can access preserved superan-
nuation) do so because of ill health [12]. This paper
builds on earlier work on the impact of chronic disease
on labour force participation [3] and utilises
Health&WealthMOD-a purpose built, up-to-date micro-
simulation model of health, income, tax and transfer
payments (payments made through the social security
system) for persons aged 45 to 64 years. This paper will
estimate the amount of income received, amount of
taxation paid, and value of transfer payments received
by individuals who have retired early due to ill health,
compared to other groups in society. It will also provide
a national estimate of the amount of lost income, and
taxation revenue, and additional transfer payments made
that could be attributed to illness related early retire-
ment in 45 to 64 year old Australians. As such, the
paper takes both a governmental perspective (by esti-
mating additional transfer payments and lost taxation),




We analysed the output dataset of a microsimulation
model, Health&WealthMOD, which is Australia’s first
microsimulation model of health and disability, the asso-
ciated impacts on labour force participation, personal
income, and government revenue and expenditure. It
was specifically designed to measure the economic
impacts of ill health on Australian workers aged 45 to
64 years. The process by which Health&WealthMOD
was built is outlined in Figure 1 and detailed below.
The base population of Health&WealthMOD was unit
record data extracted from the Survey of Disability, Ageing
and Carers (SDAC) conducted by the Australian Bureau of
Statistics in 2003 [13]. The individual level information
collected in the survey allows the modelling of a range of
impacts that disability and specific illnesses can have on
labour force participation and income, and the capturing
of variation in potential earnings and capacity to save.
From this dataset, individual records were extracted for
those aged 45-64 years and for other persons in their
family (income unit). The details extracted for each indivi-
dual in the base population included demographic vari-
ables (for example, age, sex, family type, state of residence,
and ethnic background), socioeconomic variables (level
and field of education, income, benefits received), labour
force variables (labour force participation, employment
restrictions, retirement), and health and disability variables
(chronic conditions, health status, type and extent of dis-
ability, support and care required).
Using a separate microsimulation model–STINMOD–
additional economic information such as individual
income, transfer payments, tax liabilities and the value
of wealth in different types of assets, which were not
available in the SDAC dataset, were imputed onto the
base data (Table 1 shows the variables that were taken
from the SDAC and STINMOD). The data were up-
rated to reflect 2009 currency and to account for the
demographic, labour force, earnings growth and other
changes that had occurred between 2003 and 2009.
STINMOD is Australia’s leading model of income tax
and government benefits,[14] and is maintained and
developed for the Australian Government by the
National Centre for Social and Economic Modelling. It
is routinely used by government departments for asses-
sing the distributional and revenue implications of tax
and cash transfer reforms. The model operates at the
‘micro’ level of families and individuals, and uses Aus-
tralian Bureau of Statistics Survey of Income and Hous-
ing Costs and Amenities records as the base population.
The original SDAC data was weighted by the Austra-
lian Bureau of Statistics to broad population variables
such as age and sex. However, in building a microsimu-
lation model to cost the financial impact of illness, it is
important to ensure the correct weighting for any cru-
cial policy-related sub-populations. In this case it was
important to ensure that the number and age/sex distri-
bution of sickness and disability support pension benefi-
ciaries was accurate. Therefore the sickness and
disability support pension beneficiary status were also
reweighted. The data were reweighted to represent the
2009 population.
It is not possible to exactly match individuals between
STINMOD and the SDAC. As both are based on survey
information there are few respondents in common on
both data sources. Further, the data was collected at dif-
ferent points in time, meaning that even for the few
individuals that may be in common, some variables will
no longer be the same between the SDAC and the sur-
veys underpinning STINMOD, or will have changed due
to the ageing and uprating process which ages STIN-
MOD data to 2009 e.g. age, income, labour force status
and income unit type. Furthermore, for privacy reasons
exact matching between Australian Bureau of Statistics
surveys is prohibited. As a result of these constraints,
income and wealth information was imputed onto the
base population of Health&WealthMOD by synthetically
identifying persons with similar characteristics on STIN-
MOD and “donating” their income and wealth informa-
tion onto Health&WealthMOD [15].
Eight variables: sex (2 groups), income unit type
(4 groups), type of government pension/support
(3 groups), income quintile (5 groups), age group (4
groups), labour force status (4 groups), hours worked
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per week (5 groups) and highest educational qualifica-
tion (2 groups), that were common to both datasets and
strongly related to income were chosen as matching
variables for synthetic matching.
In this paper, we used Health&WealthMOD to esti-
mate loss of income, taxation revenue and additional
government benefit payouts attributed to illness related
early retirement. The other major features of this micro-
simulation model are that it can be used to estimate the
accumulated loss of wealth at one point in time, and to
project the loss of savings associated with illness related
to early retirement from the age of retirement through to
the traditional retirement age of 65 years. Health&Wealth-
MOD can also be used to model the economic gains, in
terms of increased personal incomes and taxation revenue
and decrease in government benefit payments, as a result
of certain health interventions which reduces the inci-
dence of chronic diseases and the associated number of
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Figure 1 Estimates of lost income, tax and benefits in Health&WealthMOD.
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Statistical methods
A multiple linear regression model of the log of weekly
income was used to analyse the differences between
weekly incomes of people in the labour force (full-time
and part-time) and people not in the labour force due
to ill health. Analyses were repeated for weekly transfer
income and weekly tax liability. Co-variates: age group,
sex and highest education were adjusted for in all
regression models. Regression analysis was undertaken
on log-transformed data in order to satisfy the assump-
tions of linear regression analysis, and regression diag-
nostics confirmed that the assumptions were reasonably
satisfied. As data analyses were undertaken on a log-
scale, geometric means were presented in the results,
and thus “average” refers to the geometric means in this
paper. The analyses were undertaken using SAS V9.1
(SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA). All statistical tests
were two sided with the significance level set at 5%.
Ethical approval was not required, but the research
conformed to research conformed to the Helsinki
Declaration http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b3.htm, and to
local Australian legislation.
Results
Among 9,198 people aged between 45 and 64 years sur-
veyed for the Survey of Disability, Ageing and Carers,
4,266 (46%) were in full-time employment, 1,738 (19%)
were in part-time employment and 661 (7%) were not in
the labour force due to ill health. Once weighted, this
data represented 2,566,200 (48.5%) full-time and 975,300
(18.4%) part-time working individuals, and around
415,700 (7.9%) individuals not in the labour force due to
ill health in the Australian population aged between 45
and 64 years in the year 2009. Persons out of the labour
force due to ill health had an average weekly income
(including transfer income) of $217.8 (all values are
2009 Australian dollars), which is less than one-quarter
of the income of those employed full-time ($1167.0) and
less than half of the income of people in this age group
who were employed part-time (Table 2).
People who were not in the labour force due to ill
health received a significantly higher amount of transfer
income than people who were employed part-time or
full-time (Table 2). The average amount of weekly tax
liability of those who were not in the labour force due
to ill health was far lower than the tax paid by those
who were employed full time and employed part-time.
After adjusting for age, sex and education, people who
were out of the labour force due to ill health had 78.9%
(95%CI:-80.5 to-77.2) lower average weekly incomes
than those who were employed full time (Table 3). Gov-
ernment spending on transfer payments to those out of
the labour force due to ill health was significantly higher
than the spending on transfer payments to those who
were employed. People who were out of the labour
force due to ill health also paid 99.94% (95% CI:-99.95
to-99.93) less tax per week than those who were
employed full time.
The 7.9% of the total Australian population aged
between 45 and 64 years who reported that they were
out of the labour force due to their ill health, resulted in
a national annual loss of personal income of about $18
billion, total lost tax revenue of $1.5 billion, and increase
in social security payments of $2.1 billion (Table 4).
Discussion
Based on outcomes from Health&WealthMOD, persons
out of the labour force due to ill health are estimated to
have significantly lower average weekly incomes than
those that are in the labour force. Additionally, the
modelling shows that those who are out of the labour
force due to ill health receive higher average weekly
transfer payments and pay less tax.
This study does have some limitations to consider. In
particular, the findings are based upon respondents’ self-




Income unit type Income unit type
Type of government pension
received
Type of government pension
received
Income quintile Income quintile
Labour force status Labour force status
Hours worked per week Hours worked per week
Highest education attainment Highest education attainment
Long term health condition




Values of different asset types
Table 2 Geometric means of weekly income, transfer
payments and tax liability by labour force status for the











Employed full-time 1167.0 0.2 166.3
Employed part-time 482.9 0.9 8.9
Not in labour force
due to ill health
217.8 74.2 0.0
Note: a)Transfer income includes family payment; b) Negative incomes were
excluded from the analysis.
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reported data. Although self-report health and economic
status are regarded as valid measures [16,17], the poten-
tial for bias in the results cannot be excluded.
Brazenor (2002) found that disabled males earn 83 per
cent, and disabled females earn 76 per cent, of the
incomes of their non-disabled counterparts. This is con-
sistent with the findings of this study which has found
that individuals with no condition have higher average
weekly income than those who do have a chronic health
condition. Brazenor (2002) also found that the impact of
ill health upon earnings varied with the type of condi-
tion [18]. However, Brazenor (2002) focused only on the
impact of illness or disability on labour market earnings,
and did not take into account the reduced comparative
income from all sources when individuals are forced to
retire from the labour force early due to their illness.
This study analysed the total income from all sources
which included not only wages, but also all other private
sources, and transfer payments.
Retiring due to illness is more common among those
aged over 44. Wilkins (2003) found that the impact of a
disability on employment increased with age, with those
aged over 44 having lower labour force participation
than younger people with a disability [19]. Thus, includ-
ing the cost of lost income due to early retirement as a
result of illness is particularly important when consider-
ing heath impacts in the 45-64 year age group.
The loss of income due to illness identified in this
study may also impact upon individuals’ living standards.
Himmelstein et al. (2005) found that in the United States
one quarter of bankruptcies were attributed to chronic
illness; and 35 per cent of bankrupts were no longer
employed due to their own, or a family members’ illness.
Additionally, lost income was associated with inadequate
finances for basic services and medical care [20].
This paper highlights the cost of illness from an indi-
vidual and governmental perspective. It has shown how
people of an older working age who have fallen ill and
have been forced to leave the labour force because of
their illness now face the prospect of poorer financial
living standards due to their lower incomes. This is in
addition to the limitations and physical and mental
hardship that will be caused by the illness. Other studies
have shown that individuals who have retired from the
workforce due to ill health will not only have lower
incomes, but also lower amounts of wealth, and by the
time they reach the traditional retirement age of 65
years they will also have a smaller amount of savings
with which to support themselves [21-23]. The Austra-
lian government has made efforts to assist disabled
workers to return to the labour force, and strongly sup-
ports older and disabled workers returning or continu-
ing in the workforce [24-27]. However, for those who
are not able to work, their personal living standards are
likely to be affected due to their lower economic
resources compared to those in the labour force.
This study estimated that the increased amount of
transfer payments received by individuals who are out of
the labour force due to their ill health is $1.5 billion
annually. This quantified the increased burden that
transfer payments have on Australian governments,
which has been recognised in other studies. Cai and
Gregory (2002) found that from 1972-2002 there has
been an annual growth of over 5 per cent in the number
of people receiving a Disability Support Pension in Aus-
tralia [28], similar findings were also reported by Wilk-
ins (2003). Wilkins (2003) also found that the age of
male Disability Support Pension recipients was decreas-
ing [19]. This indicates that in Australia more people
are retiring early due to illness and that the illness
related early retirement age is decreasing.
Other authors have noted that a decline in workforce
participation as the result of early retirement will also
contribute to lost taxation revenue [29,30]. This study
demonstrated that this annual lost taxation revenue due
to ill health alone is $2.1 billion. This reduction in
Table 3 Differences in average weekly income, transfer payments and tax liability between labour force status,
adjusted for age group, sex and education, for the Australian population aged 45-64 years, 2009
Labour force status Income Transfer income Tax liability (includes Medicare levy)
% difference 95% CI p-value % difference 95% CI p-value % difference 95% CI p-value
Employed full-time Reference Reference Reference
Employed part-time -52.4 (-55.2,-49.5) <.0001 121.6 (97.9, 148.2) <.0001 -93.1 (-94.1,-92.1) <.0001
Not in labour force
due to ill health
-78.9 (-80.5,-77.2) <.0001 14503.9 (12468.3, 16869.3) <.0001 -99.94 (-99.95,-99.93) <.0001
Table 4 National annual impact of persons not in the
labour force due to ill health (adjusted for age, sex and






Not in labour force due
to ill health
17,989,175,000 1,468,007,000 2,052,384,000
Note: Based on the differences between persons not in the labour force due
to ill health and the weighted average of persons employed full time and part
time.
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taxation revenue will place a strain on government bud-
gets in meeting the costs of increased numbers of peo-
ple receiving disability pensions and the reliance upon
public health services produced by illness related early
retirement [17,31].
Cai and Kalb (2004) and Kohli and Rein (1991) both
discuss the strain that early retirement places upon gov-
ernment budgets as income from taxation declines and
spending on benefits increase [17,31]. The Economic
Implications of an Ageing Australia report states that
the labour force participation rate is expected to fall by
seven per cent by 2044-45, as low fertility rates have
resulted in a deficit of younger workers to replace those
who retire [30]. This makes the participation of those
who have not yet reached retirement age even more
important. The Intergenerational Report 2007 found that
workers aged over 55 already have a relatively low level
of labour force participation in Australia compared with
other OECD countries, and that this will become
increasingly significant in the future as the number of
people aged between 55 and 64 is anticipated to grow
by 50 per cent by 2044-45, making it the fastest growing
group of working aged people [29]. With the ageing
population, retaining these older workers will be parti-
cularly important to maintain workforce participation
which is seen as one of the best ways of maintaining
economic growth [29,32]-it is estimated that a five per
cent increase in labour force participation by 2046-47
could lead to a five per cent increase in GDP by 2046-
47 [4]; and providing revenue for government spending
to support the ageing population [31].
This paper has highlighted the costs associated with
illness related early retirement to both individuals and
to government. This differs from the friction cost
method, which argues that after a short period people
who leave the labour force due to ill health will be
replaced by other workers (either people who were pre-
viously unemployed or the relocation of existing
employees) and that productivity losses associated with
health are limited to the period needed to replace an ill
worker [33]. However, for individuals who leave the
workforce permanently due to ill health the economic
impacts will continue. In addition, Australia has a very
low unemployment rate (5% in January 2011) [34] and
significant labour shortages in some industries [35,36],
thus the high number of people out of the labour force
due to ill health is a significant constraint to economic
growth. This has been highlighted by the Australian
Treasury who aim to make Australia’s financial position
more sustainable by promoting productivity, population
growth and labour force participation [37,38].
Investment in preventive health measures is one way of
overcoming the detrimental impacts that ill health has on
workforce participation [39]. The findings of this study
align with the Australian Government’s health platform,
which recognises that chronic disease prevention can
increase labour force participation and ensure future gov-
ernment revenue is sufficient to fund health care for an
ageing population [40,41]. A preventive health approach
aims to reduce debilitating illness which often leads to
early retirement. Such outcomes will maintain, and possi-
bly increase workforce participation [42,43], thereby
helping to maintain economic growth through maintain-
ing human capital in production [29,44].
Conclusions
In the past, policy has focused upon economic incen-
tives to defer retirement [39,45]. However, as ill health
is a primary barrier to workforce participation in older
Australians, economic incentives alone may not be able
to increase participation if the underlying health condi-
tions are not addressed. Investment in improvements in
health is potentially an important way of improving
national living standards.
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